Economic losses/gains attributed to the water hyacinth by Kulyanyingi, V.
Economic Losses/Gains
Attributed to the Water Hyacinth
FIRRI Technical DocumentddDraft 2, May 2002
v/": .:..>' l-
V 'r~ l'Lc.::_ i',. :. ,
~ -: [';';t):4-~T.(~ ?.I.d.()O;) ..'r
, '.
By: V.Kulyanyingi" '\
Socio-Economics Sub - Compon ," '\ : I •
Fisheries Research Component
Fisheries Resources Research Institute (FIRRI)
P.O.Box 343, Jinja, Uganda, Fax: 256-43-120192
Email: firi@infocom.co.ugorfiri@firLgo.ugNARO
"
•
r ' ••
\
•
Preface
The Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project (LVEMP) is a regional
multi-sectoral, multi-disciplinary project funded by the riparian Governments of
Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania with a grant/loan from GEF/World Bank. It is a
five-year project original scheduled to end in June 2002.
The Socio-economic Sub-component of the project seeks to generate data that
would be used to formulate policies government management and utilization of
Lake Victoria resources with greater community participation in formulation and
implementation, so as to enable them maximize benefits from the fishery.
This is the report of a research study aimed at providing an understanding of the
fishing communities and institutions about the water hyacinth problem and how it
impacts on their activities. Its also provides strategies for sustainable control of
the weed.
The research reports are intended to disseminate the findings of the studies
carried out under the Socio-economics Sub-component of LVEMP to a wide
spectrum of users, including policy makers, stakeholders and researchers.
Any comments on the report would be most welcome .
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Executive Summary
Water hyacinth, Eichhomia crassipes a waterweed native to South America,
invaded Uganda starting from Lake Kyoga in 1988, Lake Victoria in 1989 and
spread to the Upper and Lower Victoria Nile and Lake Albert. By 1994 the weed
was covering 60% (570 ha) of the shoreline length of Lake Kyoga and 80% (500
ha) of the length of the Upper and Lower Victoria Nile. Stationary fringes of
water hyacinth covered 80% (2,200 ha) of the shoreline length of the Ugandan
portion of Lake Victoria by 1995 and mobile masses covered about 1800 ha by
1998. Overall, water hyacinth cover over Lake Victoria at the climax of the
infestation in 1998 was 12,000 ha (4000 ha in Uganda, 2000 ha in Tanzania, and
6000 ha in Kenya).
In Uganda, water hyacinth disrupted hydro-power generation at Nalubaale
formerly (Owen Falls) dam in Jinja, obstructed water transport routes especially
docking of railway wagon ferries at Port Bell, prevented or delayed landing of
boats, disrupted business at lakeside recreational centers, fouled water
abstraction points and facilities, disrupted fishing and fish marketing activities,
caused deterioration in water quality, reduced inshore spawning habitats for fish,
impacted biodiversity, and increased risks of health hazards. These impacts lead
to economic losses at both local and national level.
The large quantities of water hyacinth that covered water bodies led to
suggestions of various control options including economic utilization. The
economic options considered included production of biogas, production of crafts,
fertilizer/mulching and animal feed. However, because of the extensive negative
socio-economic and environmental effects, the Uganda Government had by 1994
developed a vision to eradicate water hyacinth, which involved large sums of
money being spent on control efforts. The overall objective of this study is to
estimate the economic losses/gains attributed to the water hyacinth in the 1990s
and also assesses the current resurgences and examines the perceptions and
preparedness of the lakeside communities and institutions towards sustainable
control of the weed.
Results show that a lot of money was lost due to water hyacinth infestation at
both local and national level. In addition the gains from the utilization of the weed
were insignificant as compared to the losses. The communities and institutions in
the areas affected by water hyacinth are still aware of the problem and the
periodic resurgences of the weed, which impact socio-economic activities. Beach
authorities/committees and lakeside institutions have maintained some level of
preparedness. However, there are some cases of laxity and lack of community
support towards manual control and inadequate control over equipment supplied.
The weevil nurseries are reported to be inadequate in number and some are not
well maintained.
IV
There is need to strengthen knowledge of the water hyacinth problem at
community and institutional levels through seminars and meetings, especially
among those communities living in areas known to be 'hot spots' to awaken
communities and institutions that had relaxed in their control activities.
Equipment for manual control should be supplied to communities and these
should be assigned to a specific beach authority such as the Landing
Management Committees (LMC) who will be accountable for them. Weevil
nurseries should be re-established, and concerned authorities should provide
training and regular supervision and socio-economic monitoring of community
and institutional knowledge, weed impacts, level of preparedness and control
impacts should be carried out on a regular basis.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and Setting
Uganda is a land locked country with a total area of 241,020;99 Km2 and lies
astride. the equator 4°N and 1° latitude and between 29.5°E to 35°E longitudes. It
has a bimodal rainfall from 300mm in the driest parts to -over 2000mm in the
wetter parts of the country. Temperatures are moderate ranging between 16°C
and 2JOC (MAAIF, '1996)
In Uganda, the surface area under water is 44,033.00 Km2 (18%) of which
36,327.76 Km2 comprise of open waters, and 7,707 Km2 of swamps
(MAAIF,1996). The fishery sub-sector contributes about 3 percent to the
Agricultural GOP which in turn contributes 42 percent of the National GOP. It
employs about 75,000 directly and about 500,000 indirectly in activities related to
fisheries giving an employment multiplier of 6.7. This implies that one fisherman
supports 7 other people to get employed in secondary and tertiary activities
related to fisheries such as processing, trading, boat construction ,fishnet making
/repairing and provision of the various support services (MAAIF,1996).
•
The fisheries sector has of recent become a major foreign exchange earner .~-, """~.'
becoming second to coffee in the recent past. In 1991, the fisheries sector :~_"':'",
contribution to GOP was valued at shillings 51.8 billion (2.6% of GOP) arid
Uganda shs.65.5 billion (2.1%) in 1998 (MFPEO 1, 1998). In 1996 fish exports
were the second highest fetching US$ 45 million and contributing 6.4% of the
total export. In 1998, the fisheries sub-sector contribution to the agricultural GOP
was 5 percent with the total fish catch of 217,000 tones. The total fish export the
same year was 14,688 tonnes worth 52.825 billion shillings.
1.2 Water Hyacinth Problem in Uganda
The water hyacinth, is a free floating weed that is native to the Amazon River
basin of South America. The weed was said to have gained access to the
northern limit of the Nile basin in Egypt between 1872 and 1892 (Gopal and
Sharma, 1981) and appeared in the central zone of Africa in the early 1950s.
The water hyacinth established itself throughout the tropical and subtropical
regions of the world (Holm et aI, 1997). It colonised both the flowing and still
water, which was nutritionally enriched by drainage from agricultural land,
discharge from the factories or urban waste and inadequately treated sewage
effluent. This enabled it to develop extensive thick mats, which drastically altered
the ecology, prevented movement by boats and efficient utilisation of water by
man and animals (Harley, 1996)
Thick mats of water hyacinth impede access to fishing areas, destroy fish traps,
increase breeding by vectors of human and animal diseases especially bilharzia.
The weed was first reported on the Ugandan waters in 1987 (Twongo, 1997) and
,:
,•
•
spread rapidly along the lakeshores aided by the interaction between the diurnal
'land and sea' breeze, which pushed viable weed units to and from the shoreline
and by the prevailing southerly/south ~asterly winds, "Yhich propelled them along
the shoreJpwards the northwest. In additiOn, the initial lack of awareness about
the impacts of the waterweed led to the spread to other water bodies in Uganda.
The ecological systems affected in Uganda by the water hyacinth are L. Victoria,
the Kyoga complex and Albert Nile. The water hyacinth spread very rapidly over
the years to fringe over 50% of the shores of Lake Kyoga, about 80% of Lake
Victoria, over 80% of the banks of River Nile and most of the Northern tip of Lake
Albert. Total weed cover was estimated about 3,100 hectares in 1994 (APe
1995) and later increased to about 6000 hectares at the peak (Twongo, 1998)
1.3 Statement of the Problem
The weed is said to have occupied about 80% of the shoreline of Lake Victoria in
the 1990s (Twongo, 1997). Because of its high proliferation rate, the weed had
established itself in most of the Ugandan water bodies blocking most of the
sheltered bays and outlets. It also covered fishing grounds, fish breeding areas
and feeding beds in lakes and rivers thus drastically impairing fish production. In
addition, the weed affected activities at key installations especially in Kampala,
Entebbe and Jinja districts. Since its entry into Ugandan waters, the weed has
created a lot of fears and caused socio-economic and environmental problems .
-
Various economic activities were therefore threatened including the incomes of
about 575,000 people who were employed directly or indirectly (Rubanza, 1998k
The gains/losses to fishermen and institutions attributed to water hyacinth when
it seriously affected them in the 1990s was not documented. Because of this,
-there is need to define the magnitude of this problem. The study therefore seeks
to establish the losses/gains estimated in monetary terms.
1.4 Overall Objective
The overall objective of the study was to estimate economic losses/gains
attributed to water hyacinth infestation in the 1990s.
Specific Objectives
i) To review costs associated with water hyacinth infestation at local level in
the 1990s
ii) To review the costs incurred due to the water hyacinth at key installations
in the 1990s.
iii) To determine the earnings accruing from the selected uses of the water
hyacinth in the 1990s .
2
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iv) To assess the losses/gains attributed to resurgences and to examine the
perceptions and preparedness of the lakeside communities and institutions
towards sustainable control of the weed.
1.5 Report Organisation
This report is divided into five sections. Section one mainly focuses on the
introduction which gives a background of the water hyacinth problem, section
two gives the literature review, section three explain~ the methodology used to
collect the relevant information required, section four presents the findings of the
study objectives and section five consists of the conclusions/recommendations of
the study .
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2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
This section examines Ii~erature on w~ter hyacinth. Information on socio-
economic. impaCts on fishers and institutions, potential uses and gains from
water hyacinth is provided.
, 2.1 Economic Effects of Water Hyacinth on Fishers
•
The weed is perceived to affect the fisheries through reduced level of production,
reduction of catch, poor quality of fish, increase in costs of operation and
obstructs fishing/navigation (Odongkara, 1997)
Nkuba (1998), estimated loss of Ug.Shs 6.4 billion in 2 years at three landing
sites namely Masese, Gaba and Kasenyi. This was due to closure of the landing
sites that no fishermen could land and Ug. Shs 233 million was the estimated
monetary value of nets lost. The nets were drifted by the floating (mobile) water
hyacinth as it was in transit and some were broken into pieces that they could.
not be used any more. There was also an additional cost of about Ug. Shs 7.5
million due to fuel increase per fishing trip. The fishermen had to break through
floating mats of the hyacinth especially that were usually encountered in the
open waters of Lake. Victoria. The delays in landing often led to fish spoilage.
Uganda mainly exports Nile perch and Tilapia (UFO, 1994) and any loss of fish
sales has direct impact on the fish exports. There were many fish processing
plants that were established and their potential could be undermined by unstable
supply due to closure of landing sites by the water hyacinth. There were 9
factories established out of 20 proposed (MFEP, 1996) and as more got into the
business, the demand would increase but the supply of fresh fish would not cope
with the demand that led to some factories operating below capacity.
Loss in fish sales had direct impact on Government revenue due to reduction of
fish exports, taxes collected from fishermen and along the distribution system
from wholesalers to retailers. With less Government revenue the budget was
affected.
The weed disrupted fishing activities at the landings. It caused loss of set fishing
gear or regularly disrupting/entangling the gear (major loss of capital). It also
caused fish to disappear by occupying fishing grounds or blocking access to and
from fishing grounds hence disabling fishermen with smaller hand-paddled
canoes that could not get beyond the invading weed infestation. Nkuba, (1998)
reported that "there was a loss of 233,916,000 Uganda shillings worth nets". This
was an indirect loss due to water hyacinth infestation on Lake Victoria. The
operation costs of the fishermen increased and this reduced the incomes of the
fishers. The frequency of the loss aggravated the already existing high costs that
reduced the profits earned from the business .
4
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2.2 Economic Effects of Water hyacinth at National level _,
Odongkara _(1997) reported a number of impacts of water hyacinth at various
establishments. The water hyacinth affected various establishments-around Lake
Victoria.
There were economic losses to industrial fish processors in terms of poor quality
fish due to delays in fish delivery. There were also extra costs incurred by fish
companies for providing ice to fishermen at subsidised rates (Odongkara, 1997)
,.
The weed increased costs of hydropower generation at the former Owen falls
dam (Jinja). The weed affected water filters and turbines at the electricity
generation plant and contributed to frequent load shading. There was loss in
power generation time due to increase in rate of cleaning the gate screens and
servicing of the cooling system of turbines blocked by fine weed debris. In
addition, there were extra costs of physical extraction- of water hyacinth biomass
from the dam and subsequent loss in production at various industries due to
increase in frequency of load shedding (Odongkara, 1997)
It was reported that Uganda Railways Cooperation had services shifted
temporarily from Port bell to Jinja because the pier had been damaged. It also
choked the engine filters of the ship thus increasing the frequency of cleaning
and replacement. It was also reported to have caused breakage of the bridge
link-span as the ships pushed against it when entering the dock (Odongkara,
1997)
At Entebbe resort beach, rotting debris and odours made the beach unattractive.
In addition, green snakes associated with water hyacinth wandered about the
beach gardens scaring customers and hindering swimming and other beach
games. The resort beach spent Ug. Shs 14 million to erect a metallic barrier to
hold backwater hyacinth and after two months, the force of mobile weed biomass
broke the structure. The firm then set up a rope barrier at a cost of Shs3 million.
It also employed a standing work force of 3 to 20 men to extract the weed
manually at an average wage of Ug. Shs 100,000 per person per month. In
addition, more labour was hired as and when required at Ug. Shs 4,000 per
5
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•person per day. Hand tools including rakes, shovels, and wheelbarrows, as well
as protective wear such as hand gloves and gumboots were also purchased.
The weed biomass disposal required daily use of several pick-ups, (Odongkara,
1997) . ..
2.3 Potential uses of the Water Hyacinth
2.3.1 Making Biogas.
The weed can be used for making biogas (Ogwang 1998). It was observed that
the daily gas production of water hyacinth could reach threshold values of 1
litre/day at 150 days for garbage and dry hyacinth and 200 days for fresh water
hyacinth (Lopez ef aI, 1997).
Luzira maximum prison in Kampala was active in utilising the water hyacinth.
The prisoners would collect the hyacinth, mix it with a little cow dung and
generate biogas in two digests. The gas was stored and used to cook meals for
over 2,000 prisoners during the frequent power cuts. In this way, the prison
saved about Ug. Shs. 6 million/year and it had also saved about 300m3 of fire"
wood or 8 hectares of wood land (Nkuba, 1997)
2.3.2 Preparing Silage
Scientists in the Faculty of Agriculture at Makerere University in Uganda have
developed a simple method to prepare nutritious feed for livestock from water
hyacinth that promises to commercialise this use. Silage is made by combining
wilted water hyacinth with 10% maize bran and allowing the mixture to ferment
for 20 days. Silage is produced by the activities of naturally occurring bacteria
that convert some of the plant sugars into organic acids that preserve nutritional
qualities. The finished product is golden brown in colour, sweet smelling, readily
acceptable to cattle and may be stored for long periods without loss of quality
(Mutetika, 1998)
2.3.3 Mulching
Around the shores of Lake Victoria, the water hyacinth was collected by farmers,
and also used as mulch around their banana plantations. An increasing number
of people collected the stems, dried them and made crafts (Nkuba, 1997)
2.3.4 Making Fertilizers
In Kampala Bio-Earth (U) Ltd, they used water hyacinth as the main feed stock
for producing a range of fertilizers with varying N,P,K ratios. The project had
been dependent on aid, but it had a potential to become a self-financing viable
business (Nkuba, 1997)
6
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2.3.5 Treatment of Effluents
Water hyacinth is believed to groY" well in pla~es that receive industrial
discharge.~. Some scientists believe that one of the uses of the weed is to purify
industrial wastes (Ogwang, 1998)
2.3.6 Making Paper
Water hyacinth can also be used to make paper. But due to the bulk nature of
its fibre, the quality of the paper made from water hyacinth could be sub-
standard. Further more, the cost of collecting and transporting the weed to the
paper manufacturing factories would make it uneconomical (Lopez et aI, 1997).
2.4 Gains from Water hyacinth
At local level, the major positive attributes of the water hyacinth were
employment from manual weed biomass removal at landings where communities
pooled money to pay for labour, provision of hand tools and protective wear
whose use was not always restricted to water hyacinth removal. In addition,
there were increased catches of lungfish and catfish at stationary fringes of water
hyacinth. Gains from other enterprises that made use of the water hyacinth were
yet to be evaluated (Nkuba, 1997)
7
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3.0
3.1
METHODOLOGY
Introduction
• .....This section presents methods used to collect data and it analyses and
describes the research design, study areas, study population, sample selection
procedure and data collection. Quantitative, qualitative and participatory
research methodologies were applied. A review of existing literature was made
from reports produced during the last water hyacinth peak in the 1990s.
Interviews were also held with knowledgeable people and officials of the various
organisations that are affected by the water hyacinth in one way or the other and
a sample of fishermen randomly selected from fish landing sites in selected
districts.
The valuation methods used in this study were mainly establishing the loss of
income due to decline or loss in productivity and the cost of replacement. On the
other hand, the gains due to the presence of the weed were also established.
3.2 Secondary data
.. A review of relevant document was undertaken to obtain an assessment of the
losses/gains attributed to the weed on fishing communities and institutions during
the time of peak infestations in the 1990s. This data was collected from the
libraries of FIRRI, NEMA, MISR and DFR, Entebbe. Detailed reviews were
specifically undertaken for the following relevant documents of Odongkara,
(1997), Twongo, (1995/6), Nkuba, (1997) and Rubanza (1997) who undertook
studied related to socio-economic gains and losses of the weed during peak
infestation. Documents at key installations were also reviewed to assess the
losses attributed to water hyacinth infestation in the 1990s.
3.3 Primary Data Collection
Assessment of knowledge, perception, impacts and role of lakeside communities
and institutions and gains and losses associated with the resurgent weed was
done using questionnaires and focus group discussions.
3.3.1 Area of Study
The study was mainly conducted on landing sites in selected districts/bays on
Lake Victoria. In additions key establishments on the lake were also surveyed to
assess the gains/losses attributed to water hyacinth infestation.
3.3.2 Sampling Procedure
The sample survey was randomly selected according to the distribution on the
water body (Lake Victoria). Nine districts (Rakai, Masaka, Mpigi, Kampala,
Mukono, Jinja, Iganga, Bugiri and Busia) surround Lake Victoria. Five districts
8
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•were selected using a sample random sampling procedure. The sampling
procedure involved the following; each of the districts was assigned a number
and the number was written on a piece of paper and folded several times. The
folded papers were then put in a box, which was. shuffled several times. FIve
pieces of paper picked from the box, one at a time and the districts represented
by the numbers on the papers were selected for the study. The landing sites
visited were selected along bays of Lake Victoria. This was to enable selection of
respondents from all affected bays and uniformly spread the study on Lake
Victoria. The landing sites visited were Bulingo in Bunjako bay, Kitubulu in
Kitubulu/Entebbe bay, Ggaba in Murchison bay, Namoni in Hannington bay,
Wakawaka in Macdonald bay and Majanji in Berkeley bay. In total 14 fish
landings were visited.
•
..
At the beaches, respondents were purposively selected the following categories
were deemed to posses knowledge about the water hyacinth problem. A total of
190 respondents were interviewed mostly involved in fishery activities (173),
water transport (9), hotel business (2), fetching water (2) and other beach-based
activities (4) at the selected landing sites.
3.3.3 Data Collection Procedure
,
Data from primary sources was collected between November 2001 and March
2002 through interviews held with members of fishing communities -and-.'
management of institutions to assess the status of water hyacinth management. -tl. .' ..
.- - '.:" .~.:~;.~ ;:
Information was obtained using focus group discussions. These focused on .. - _.~;;., -
impacts of the weed, potential uses and control activities in place. Respondents
who are knowledgeable about the water hyacinth were selected for the focus
group discussions at the selected landings. A structured questionnaire was also
used to carry out interviews with members of fishing communities.
Key informant Interviews were carried out with members of
committees/authorities concerned with water hyacinth control at the selected fish
landings and management of four institutions on Lake Victoria, namely; Entebbe
Water Works, Lido Beach, Uganda Railways Corporation ferry terminal at Port
Bell and Nalubaale/Kiira Dam in Jinja. In total 14 key informants at beaches were
interviewed and these included; officials of the LMCs (6), the 'Gabunga' (4)
beach landlord (1) and the staff of the DFR (3) and these were selected because
they were deemed to posses knowledge of various control activities at the
community level.
The above methods of data collection were also reinforced with various
observations made by the researchers at the beach and relevant photographs
taken .
9
..
I
3.3.4 Data processing
Questionnaires were edited in the field to, chec.k for any unfill~d questions and
'short hand'. Data. was entered on the SPSS data file editor. Frequencies were
run for data cleaning and production of counts and percentages. Where
necessary cross tabulations were also run. Tables and pie charts have been
used for the display of the data.
3.4 Strengths and Limitations of the Methodology
It was difficult to obtain satisfactory information at local level since most
fishermen did not keep records. However, some were able to give some
estimates of losses. In addition this study greatly focused on secondary data
from reports that were produced during the last peak attack in the 1990s. Most of
these studies were conducted at selected landings and this did not give a good
representative sample of the riparian communities.
..
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4.0 FINDINGS
This section presents the findings from the primary and secondary data sources.
Discussions of .the findings from several rep.orts of the studies that were
conducted in the 1990s at local and national level are made. In addition, current
resurgence findings are also discussed with respect to the study objectives.
4.1 Review of Costs incurred due to the Water hyacinth at Local level
(Fish landings) in the 1990s
Twongo (1996) reported that the water hyacinth washed in and out of the bays
seasonally. The effective time spent on these bays and hence landing sites
depended on whether the bays are open or sheltered. It was estimated the total
time spent on landing sites in open bays to one week and 8 weeks for the closed
bays.
According to the study, most of the fishermen indicated that the only way they
could cope with the weed was to wait until it cleared. This would imply that for
these weeks the fishermen in the affected landing sites would not be able to go
fishing. It was roughly estimated that 60% of the landing sites were in the open
bays and 40% in the closed bays. From the survey results, 94% reported their
landing sites being closed temporarily with only 6% reporting permanent closure
of landing sites. About 77% of the fishermen said that they had to wait for weed
to clear before they could go fishing.
Table 4.1: Respondents reporting Incidents of Weed Closing Landing
sites by Water body
Water Respondents Reporting
Body
Temporary Permanently Total
Closed Closed
Count Perce Count Percent Count Percent
nt
L. Victoria 97 100% 97 100%
L.Kyoga 72 97% 2 3% 94 100%
L. Albert 52 80% 13 20% 65 100%
Total 221 94% 15 6% 236 100%
Source: Odongkara, 1997
Out of 245 respondents who answered the question on their daily incomes, 89%
were earning a daily income of Ug. Shs 1000 and above with the average daily
income as Ug. Shs 6,711 Uganda shillings. Assuming the study sample to be
11
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In addition to this direct loss of income by not going to fish, the fishermen also . ~..~, .
v ",_'; _ ~:' 'f•...•••••,
incurred losses due to delayed landing of catch which led to deterioration in. thf? "..1' '. . '•.
quality of the fish. Delayed landing also reduced the price offered on late arrival
for marketing. The presence of the weed also led to increased costs since the .
weed mats carried away the nets or destroyed them. There were also other 'costs" -
like repair of damaged out board engines, provision of additional ice to save the
fish, more fuel to take care of delayed landing and costs for rescuing boats that
got stuck in the weed. All these considerably reduced the prices the fishermen
received compared to when the weed had not impended their return.
•
Given the fact that 60% of the landing sites were in open bays where the weed
blocked the landing sites for an effective period of 1 week, the fishermen
affected in this case would be 36,000 and the amount of income lost for the
whole of this week would be 36,000 multiplied by 6,711 by 6 days totalling to
Ug. Shs 1,449,576,000 shillings. Those in closed bays (24,000 fishermen) would
not go fishing for a total of 8 weeks and would therefore loose 24,000 multiplied
by 6,711 by 48 days (assuming fishermen go fishing six days a week when there
is no weed). This leads to loss of income of Ug. Shs 7,731,072,000 by
fishermen in closed bays. The total loss of income by fishermen because. of not., ,
going to fish is therefore estimated at Ug. Shs 9,280,648,000 (Nkuba, 1997)
representative of the whole fishing community, and more than 96% of the fish
catch coming from these water bodies, over 80% of the estimated 75,000
fishermen in the whole county at that time were on these affected water bodies
hence were affected by the weed (Nkuba, 1997). This woulq imply that for each
day of not going to fish due to the weed the fisherman would loose 6,711
shillings. Eighty percent of the estimated 75,000 fishermen is approximately
60,000 failing to go fishing at anyone time and losing 6,71.1 per day because of
the weed. This results into a loss equivalent to about 40 billion shillings per day
as loss of income to the fishermen.
.•
Given that we are assuming that the sample is representative of the fishermen
community and considering that 77% answered as being affected by the weed, it
has been estimated that the same holds for the total fishing population, thus
57,750 of the fishermen were affected by the weed but of these only 60% fish in
open bays where the weed closed the sites for a total of one week and could
afford to venture in to the waters in the rest of the 7weeks when the weed is
around.
12
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Odongkara (1997), reported the greatest impact of the water hyacinth on the
fishing activities as follows:
Table 4.2: Greatest impact of Water hyacinth on Fishing Activities by
Water bodies
Impact L. Kyoga L. Albert L. Victoria Overall
Carries away 71% 78% 62% 70.3%
nets
Blocks transport 6% 1% 12% 6.3%
Scarcity of fish 21% 20% 22% 21%
Covers fishing 2% 1% 2% 1.7%
grounds
Others - - 2% 0.7%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Odongkara, 1997
According to the study, the time required to catch. the same amount of fish when
there is no weed increased by 69% from 6.5hrs to 11.1 hrs on average, while the
amount of fish caught per day also reduced by 69.4 percent from an average of
62 kgs to 19 kgs. The fuel used in the presence of the weed increased by 60.6%
(34,650 fishermen). The loss due to reduction of fish catch can be estimated by
assuming that those who were fishing in open bays could afford to go fishing
when the weed was around since they were effectively blocked for only one
week.
The fish catch reduced by 43 kg every day for 42 days when. the weed was
present but had not permanently blocked the landing sites. The total loss is
therefore obtained by multiplying the fish lost from reduced catch by the number
of days (42 days) and the price offered per kg of fish and then multiply by total
number of the fishermen affected that is 43 multiplied by 42 days by 34,650 by
200 totalling to Ug. Shs 12,515,580,000.
It was also reported that in trying to cut their way through the water hyacinth
mats, boats needed more time and had to use more fuel. They used about 30
percent above the normal requirement on average but sometimes they used 3
times the normal amount depending on infestation. The maintenance costs of
the engines also increased including total breakdown and engine knock due to
the weed. In addition, the fishermen had to incur an extra expenditure for buying
ice to carry with them to preserve the fish due to the long time they anticipated to
stay on the waters either due to delayed landing or spending much more time
trying to increase their fish catch .
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From the study with the fishermen, it was noted that a fisherman'- required 1
kilogram of ice to preserve 2.5 kilograms of fish. Since the average fish catch
had been established to be around 62 kg on a good day~tliis-would-require 25
kg of ice for preservation. One kilogram of ice cost about Ug. Shs 150. Since
from the start it had been assumed that it was only the fishermen in the open
bays that could afford to venture into the waters when the weed was around.
They would be the only people to incur such expenses. The total incurred
therefore would be 25kg multiplied by Ug. Shs 150 by 42 days by 34,650
fishermen totalling to Ug. Shs 5,457,375,000 as the total expense of this nature
incurred.
In addition, it was established during the study that about 3% of the fishermen
had to repair their engine propeller shafts when the weed damages them at least
once in a year. It cost between 150,000 and 200,000 Uganda shillings to have
such damage repaired. An average of 175,000 had been used and the total
expense incurred by the fishermen in this way estimated by multiplying 175,000
shillings by 3% of 34650 fishermen (1039.5) thus giving the total expense as Ug.
Shs 181,912,500.
Table 4.3: Cost Imposed on the Fishing Community when the Weed is
Present
Time required to catch the Same amount Without With
the Weed Weed
Time required to catch the same amount 6.5 hrs 11 hrs
Time spent when landing 1.2 hrs 3.2 hrs
Amount of fuel used (Iitres) 33 litters 53
litres
Amount of fish caught (kilograms) 62 kilograms 19 kg
Number of nets owned by an individual 50 nets -
hence lost
Amount of ice required in the weed 1kg per 2.5 kg of -
presence fish
The cost of replacing a motor board engine 2,750,000 shillings
The cost of repairing a Motor board engine 150,000 - 200,000 -
Source: Odongkara, 1997
Given that the affected water bodies contribute around 96%of the total fish catch
in the whole country. It can be correctly assumed that over 90% of the 75,000
fishermen operated on these water bodies. If we also assume that the 77% of
the sample had all their nets carried away at least once in a year, this would
imply that 57,750 fishermen lost their nets every year. It had been established
from the discussions with the fisher-folk during the study that a single fisherman
normally required or used a minimum of about 50 fishnets on average and each
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costs about 8,000 Uganda shillings. If each of these fishermen" is to loose his
fleet of nets and have them replaced at least once in the year because of the
:weed, this wo.uld imply an additional cost of 8,000 multiplied by 50 by 57,750
totalling toUg.Shs 23,100,000 imposed on the fishermen community due to fish
net destruction.
Nkuba, (1995) reported that at three landing sites on Lake Victoria, 60 fishermen
lost nets worth Ug. Shs 233.9 million, 6.1 billion worth of fish sales, and 7.5
million worth of fuel increase due to delays on the lake caused by the weed.
Table 4.4: Monetary loss in Millions of Uganda Shillings 1994/95
•
•
Landing site Gaba Kasenyi Masese Total
Estimated monetary value of fish 419.2 3,968.9 1,772 6,160
sales lost (Ug.shs) ~
Monetary value of nets lost (Ug shs) 52 199.6 62.3 233.9
Monetary value of fuel increase per 2 3.8 1.7 7.5
fishing trip (Ug shs)
Total 426.4 4,172.4 1,836.1 6,481
( Ug Shs )
Source: Nkuba, 1995
The cost incurred due to the extra time the fishermen had to spend on the water
due to delayed landing or in an attempt to catch more fish has not been captured .
because it was not possible to capture these costs during the study.
When asked as to whether they had observed changes in species composition
since the weed appeared on landing sites, out of 184 respondents who
answered this question, 57% said they had not seen any change while for 47%"
said they had observed a change of species being caught. Some people also
thought that there had been a decline in the size of the fish being caught since
the weed appeared. Sixty people answered this question and 55% thought the
size had reduced while 45 believed the size was still the same (Nkuba, 1995)
Among those who believed the size had changed, 53% attributed it to the weed,
13% thought there was less food in the lake, 16% thought it was due to over
fishing while 19% thought it was because of using wrong gears. As to how the
situation could be addressed, 41% thought the fishermen needed to be
educated, and 10% thought that fishing in breeding areas should be prohibited
(Nkuba, 1995)
Fishermen also reported that their boats were engulfed by the water hyacinth
while in the process of fishing. When there was delayed landing of fish due to the
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Ipresence of the water hyacinth, there was normally deterioration of the fish
quality and late arrival for market activities. All these considerably reduced the
prices the fisherman received compared to when the weed ,had not impen.ded
their return. It was however not possible to capture the cost associated with all
this during the study. But it had been observed that Nile perch which was
normally sold at Ug. Shs. 1,000 per kg on Lake Victoria when fresh and could
fetch as little as Shs. 300 per kg when boats were delayed by three hours
(Nkuba, 1995)
Odongkara (1997) observed that for the last three years the fisheries had been
characterized by prolonged periods of poor catch on most of the water bodies in
Uganda, and most of the respondents had reported that this happened because
the weed had blocked the breeding grounds (95% of respondents) and deprived
the fish of oxygen with Tilapia being the most affected.
On a more regular basis, the weed entangled into fishermen's nets and quite
often, boats got stuck in the weed and had to be retrieved using additional man
power and bigger boats. The choking of out board engines had been reported as
a major concern of fishermen as weed particles got stuck in to the engines
affecting the cooling systems. Several engines were reported to have had engine
knock because of this. If we assume that about 1% of the fishermen in open .
bays lost their engines due to the weed damage and had to replace them in a
year, then the cost incurred would be 346.5 multiplied by 2,750,000 (the average
cost of a new engine at that time) adding up to Ug. Shs 952,875,000.
Rubanza (1998) reported that the costs incurred on the fisheries alone were:
(1) Loss of income due to failure to go fishing
Fishermen in open bays
Fishermen operating in closed bays
(2) Loss of fishing nets
(3) Loss due to reduction in fish catches
(4) Cost of extra fuel used
(5) Cost incurred on purchase of ice
(6) Cost incurred due to engine repair
(7) Cost incurred due to replacement of motor boat engines
Sub-total:
1,440,576,000
70,731,072,000
23,100,000,000
10,012,464,000
4,425,120,000
5,457,375,000
181,912,500
952,875,000
116,310,390,000
••
•
During this study, 262 respondents were interviewed, 131 from Lake. Victoria, 71
from Lake Kyoga and 60 from landing sites on Lake Albert .
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•4.1.2 Effect of the Weed on Water Transport at Community Level
Nkuba (1997) reported that out of 26~ respondents interviewed in his study, 7
respondents or. 2.7% of the sample were. involved in water transport as their
major activity and 13% (34) in land transport. Seventy seven percent of those
involved in water transport undertook only one trip per day. Ninety four percent
said the weed blocked their landing sites while 6% said the weed chocked their
engines.
Table 4.5: Impact of the Weed on Transport
Impact L.Kyoga L. Albert L. Victoria Combined
Blocks the landing sites 94% 94% 94% 94%
Chocks the engine 6% 6% 5% 5.7%
Others - - 1% 0.3
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Nkuba, 1997
Income per trip made was reported to range from less than Ug. Shs 5,000 to
over 50,000 per trip/day during the study. The majority of these transporters
reported to be earning a daily income of between Ug. Shs 10,000 and 50,000
per day. The mean daily income for these transporters was estimated at Ug.
Shs 52,608. Taking the sample to be representative of the riparian communities,
the 2.7% represent water transporters out of the estimated 500,000 people
estimated to be associated with fisheries that time. These people were bound to
be out of business when the weed blocked the landing sites as well as using
extra fuel whenever the weed found them on water. Working on the assumption
that like fishermen, 60% of them were found in open bays while 40% were
operating in closed bays which got blocked for a longer time, 2.7% of 500,000
would be 13,500 and 8,100 would be operating in open bays (Nkuba, 1997)
Those operating in open bays would therefore not be able to go out of the
landing sites for the one week when the weed mat had invaded the landing sites.
They would therefore loose their daily incomes worth 21,000 multiplied by 52,608
by 7 days equating to Ug. Shs 2,982,873,600. In addition, since the weed was
reported to prevail on the waters for about 8 weeks a year in the water including
on those bays, the water transporters in these bays would loose another two
weeks income through delayed landing take off and getting stuck in the mud,
hence a sum of Ug. Shs 5,965,747,200 in addition. Their total loss was therefore
estimated at Ug. Shs 8,948,620,800.
Like the fishermen operating in closed bays, the water transporters in these bays
would stay at home for the whole duration of the year thus loosing an income of
about Ug. Shs 52,608 multiplied by 5,400 by 42 days thus a total cost/loss of Ug.
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Shs 11,931,494,000. The total loss of income by water transporters is therefore
estimated at Ug. Shs 20,880,114,800. If we assume that like fishermen at that
time, 12~/o of them used motorised boats and would therefore spend 60%
additiona'l- fuel to take' care of delayed landings. This would cost them arl.
additional 2,520 multiplied by 20 Iitres by 1200(cost per liter) by 21 days thus
equating to about Ug. Shs 1,270,080 billion. For those working in closed bays, if
we assume that they would not be able to access thecwater as long as the weed
was present (8 weeks), they would have to do with out their daily earnings from
this activity-thus a loss of about Ug.Shs 14,000 multiplied by 52,608 by 48 days
equating to Ug. Shs 35,352,576,000.
4.2 Water hyacinth Control Options and the Costs involved
4.2.1 Manual Control at Community Level
Rubanza (1998) reported that communities in Iganga, Jinja and Mukono were
reported to demand between Sh.100 to300 per wheelbarrow load of weed which
was roughly about 15Kg. Given the average figure of 250 tonnes of the weed/ha
,the local communities were reported to charge a figure of Shs.200 per wheel
burrow. If we use this figure to estimate the cost of removing the weed manually,
the cost of removing 1 hectare of the weed manually would be about Ug. Shs
3,300,000 and take one person about 238 days to remove 1 hectare based on
the assumption that one person can remove about 70 wheelbarrows or 1.05
tonnes per day.
It would take about Ug. Shs19.8 billion remove the 6000 ha coverage of weed on
lake Victoria assuming that the weed had never increased or reduced. From the
survey results, out of 256 respondents 70% were not willing to accept any
payment less than 1000 shillings- per day to remove the weed and only 20% said
that they would be willing to participate at any pay less than 500 shilling per day.
One man could remove about 50 wheel burrows per day
Each wheel burrow weighed 15kgs.
One hectare of water hyacinth was estimated at 250 metric tonnes.
250 tonnes is an equivalent of about 16667 wheel burrows
It therefore required Ug. Shs 20,000 billion to remove the weed. Assuming no
growth, it would have taken 5479.6 years for one man.
Manual removal was generally very slow and difficult to cope with the growth rate
of the weed. From the survey undertaken (Odongkara, 1997) many respondents
emphasised support for the manual option for removing the weed and the
reasons given for preferring the manual method was that some saw it as a
chance to get employed. There was a general belief among the public that there
was a lot of money associated with water hyacinth control in the country at that
time .
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4.2.2 Biological Control
Twongo (1997) reported that the weevils seemed to be doing much better in the
Ugandan-environment than elsewhere. A' single weevil produced 8 eggs per
production and produces five generations per year compared to 3 or 4 in other
areas. It was estimated that this method cost about Sh.15,000 per hectare from
introduction to when control is achieved. It therefore required a minimum of 90
million shillings to control the 6000 hectare weed at that time. But this did not
include the initial start up costs and overheads in the weevil rearing process ..
These estimates were done with the rearing that was carried out at Namulonge
Agricultural research institute. The onshore rearing facilities eliminated the costs
of transporting the weevil from the rearing tanks located in Namulonge research
institute to release sites.
It was further. established that it required 3,000 Us dollars or 4 million Uganda
shillings to set up a unit of an offshore rearing unit capable of supplying 500,000
weevils per year on the lakeside and pay for the attendants and five of these
units were set on Lake Victoria (Twongo et aI, 1997)
..-
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4.2.3 Chemical Control
This could be achieved either using a boat or by use of an aircraft. When using a . '....
boat, it was estimated that one can spray 7hectares per day at a cost of US $ 59 .\ :'.' ~~<
per acre or Ug. Shs 77,000. This approach would take 857 days to spray the"~:.- ~'~-"'..' ''''.
6000 ha and cost Us $ 345,000 or Ug. Shs 462,000,000 million (Nyeko, 1990) . "!".'/ ;i-:i\
'- .- :-.~ ..
In case of using an aircraft for spraying it is estimated that 100 hectares can be
sprayed per day at a cost of about 319,800 per hectare. Thus would take at least
two months to treat the 6000 hectares at an estimated cost of 1.46 billion
shillings using one plane for a single application. It is often necessary for another
follow up treatment to challenge re-growth (Nyeko, 1990)
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Table 4.6: Comparative Costs and Time.(1990s)
Methodology Cost per ha Time to ,Time for Total Cost
Ushs. Remove aha. Removal of Ushs...
6000 ha
Manual 3,300,000 238 days Depends on 19.8 billion
manpower
employed
Mechanical 534,375 5.7 16 years 4.29 billion
Biological 15,000 After 5 years 150 million
Chemical 77,000 1 hr 2.35 years 462 million
spray
(boat) ..
Chemical 319,800 5rrlinutes 4months 2.92 billion
spray
(aerial)
4.2.4 Policy Implications
The total cost the various socio-economic groups incurred was about seven
billion and six hundred and ninety eight million shillings (67,698,416,220) as
compared to nineteen billion and eight hundred million shillings required for the
most expensive control option. Chemical control option is the cheapest option for
control of the weed and it would take a short time, however there was a risk of
affecting the fish ,people and marine life (Nkuba, 1997)
The biological control option was the second cheapest control option and the
officer in charge, was convinced that the option delivered tangible results. Impact
studies in areas where it had been applied indicated that it had effectively
checked the water hyacinth growth in a period of about five years. While manual
control of the water hyacinth seemed to be the most preferred option, it was the
most expensive option.
4.3 Economic Losses at Key Installations in the 1990s
4.3.1 Effect on Water Supply and Water Quality
Water supply points especially around Kampala, Jinja and Entebbe were
affected by the presence of the water hyacinth. Amount of water pumped daily at
that time (1996)
Kampala
Jinja .
Entebbe area
147,000,0001t./day
28,700,0001t./day
7,600,0001t./day
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It was however established that it was only Entebbe water works that was
normally affected by the water hyacinth. The Gaba water works was designed in
such a way that it could draw water from the lake-with out being affected by the
weed. Since Entebbe water works drew raw water from offshore, it was greatly
affected by the presence of the water hyacinth.
Table 4.7: Amount of Water Supplied per day and Cross Earnings(1996)
Type of Amount Unit cost Total Percentage
Institution supplied Revenue (%)
Domestic 1333.3m3 616/m3 821,312.8 30.6
Industrial 433.3m3 1056/m3 457,564.8 17.0
Institutions 1833.3m3 760/m3 1,393,308 51.9
Public 33.3m3 400/m3 13,320 0.5
standpipe
3866.7m3 2,685,505.6 100.0
The manager of the National Water and Sewerage Co-operation reported that 8
hours of water hyacinth interruption lead to a reduction in total water supply by
about 1000m3. On average, an average household was estimated to be using
0.1m3 per day or 100 litres.
When the water hyacinth was present, the filters were normally washed every 30
minutes and this happened about threes time a year lasting for about 14 days
every time it came. Given that when the weed was present there was an 8 hour
interruption by the weed leading to reduction of total water supply of 1000m3 per
day.
If we assume that this reduction is proportionally distributed according to the
same ratios in which it was supplied to various categories, the domestic
consumer would experience 30.6% reduction, 17% of this water shortage would
be felt by industrial plants, 51.9% by the institutions and 0.5% by the public stand
pipe consumers. This implies that the domestic consumers would experience a
shortage of 300m3, industrialist 170m3, institutions 519m3 and 5m3 for the
consumers on public standpipes.
In addition to Entebbe water works was forced to pay an additional 7500 per
month to its regular work force of 16 to ensure that when the weed is present
they could remove it manually as an additional responsibility. This lead to an
additional expense of 75000 /month multiplied by 16 by 12 totalling to Ug. Shs
14,400,000 per year.
Without the weed, the pumping station used 550 kg of chlorine per month to treat
its water as compared to 690 kg when the weed was present. This therefore
imposed an additional 140 kgs of chlorine with a drum of 950 kg costing 800 US
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dollars. This is an equivalent of 0.84 dollars per kg hence 140 multiplied by 0.84
by 1450 by 1.5 month thus a total of Ug. Shs 255,780 on water treatment per
year.
' ..
In addition, frequent back wash caused some of the broken parts of the weed to
pass through the filters leading to poor quality water as well as choking the
service pipes and blocking the meters. While it was difficult to estimate the cost
of unblocking the choked service pipes, it was estimated that at that time 200
meters were faulty because of this and required about Ug. Shs 10,000 each to
be serviced thus a total of about Ug. Shs 2,000,000.
The water works was at that moment serving 1,958 domestic consumers out of
its 3,200 total customers of which 900 were on average expected to be off
service for one reason or the other. The domestic consumers were expected to
consume 1333.3 cm3 per day and the weed reduced this amount by 300 cm3
This implied that there would be a shortage of 22.5% to the domestic consumer.
The 22.5% would have to improvise and spend time and money to collect water
from alternative sources. This implies that 440.55 households out of the 1,958
would have to improvise on such sources.
It had been estimated that on average one household used five jerry cans of
water (100 litters) per day. It cost about Ug. Shs 200 to have these jerry cans of
water delivered at home that would be an extra cost imposed on the affected
households by the weed. A total cost of 440.55 multiplied by 5 jerry cans per day
by 200 shillings by 14 days the weed lasted on the pumping station by the 3
times the weed appeared every year. This totals to Ug. Shs 18.5 million.
4.3.2 Effect of the Water hyacinth on Hydropower Generation
As far as generation of hydro-electric power is concerned, the water hyacinth is
known to block the screens causing stoppage of the generators regularly for
cleaning thus reducing the total out put by 3 MW whenever one machine was
shut off and it was also reported to cause breakage of screens. According to the
manager UEB, four screens were broken between January and September 1998
and they were repaired at a cost of about Ug. Shs 2.5 million each. This
therefore caused UEB an additional expenditure of 10.0 million shillings.
it was a common phenomenon for the weed to reduce the rate of flow of water
into the cooling system leading to a rise in temperatures thus forcing
management to shut off the affected machines for an hour or two to cool down
every day before it could be switched on again. In September 1998 alone water
hyacinth caused UEB stoppage of 45 hrs.
In the month of October, 1998 UEB had lost a total of 1,298.2 Mega byte hours
due to water hyacinth alone losing earnings worth 91,130 US dollars or about
Ug. Shs 132,403,850 at the exchange rate of 1450 shillings per dollar at that
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time. If we assume that the problem lasts for four months in the year, the total
amount of power generation lost would be worth Us $ 365,252 or Ug. Shs
529,615,400 per year. In addition, the households that used power for lighting
and cooking would have to spe~d more in improvising due to increased "load
shading. Lighting Kampala alone required 200 mega watts while each factory
required a minimum of 3 MW.
Given that UEB lost 1,298.2-megabyte hours in the month of October 1998
alone. If we take it as the average monthly loss and divide by 30 days, it would
imply that the company is losing 42.3 megabytes hours per day. This would be
an equivalent of 42300 kilowatts hours per day. From the study, it was
established that an individual household used 138.5 kilowatts per month on
average for simple domestic energy requirements like lighting, occasional ironing
of clothes and playing a radio per month. This is an equivalent of 4.6-kilowatt
hours (kWh) per day.
Customers served by UES (1996)
-"->-
Domestic
Commercial
Industrial
General
Street lighting
133,067
17,078
40
509
147
Since UEB had not been producing enough power and had been subjecting its
customers to chronic load shading, any loss in power generation increased the
burden of load shading on its customers. The loss of 42300 kWh per day would
therefore imply denying 9,195.7 households power in the load shading process
due to the weed every day if we assume that the domestic consumers absorb all
this. This would force them to improve and switch to other sources of energy for
their domestic energy requirement such as using Kerosene for domestic lighting
and charcoal for cooking. The study established that a household needed about
0.25 litters of Kerosene/paraffin for domestic lightening per night. This would
therefore imply that the domestic energy consumer would be forced to spend
9195.7 multiplied by 0.25 by 760 shillings totalling to 1,747,183 per day on
domestic lighting that would have otherwise been supplied by UEB. Since it had
been estimated that the weed lasted for about four months in a year, the total
cost would be 1,747,183 multiplied by 120 days totalling to Ug. Shs 209,661,960
per year.
If we assume that 30% of the 133,067 domestic consumers used the power for
cooking, on load shading they would be forced to use alternative sources like
charcoal or paraffin for their cooking. It had been established that an average
household depending on charcoal for cooking used about 1 sack of charcoal per
week. A sack of charcoal in Kampala cost about Ug. Shs 12,000 divided by
seven days in a week equating to about 4,729,217 per day. Since the weed was
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estimated to infest the dam for about four months, this would amount to
4,729,217 multiplied by 120 days equating to Ug. Shs 577,506,060. In addition,
UEB had to recruit 34 people permanently ~t a rate of Ug. Shs 3000 per day.
Th_iscost UEB Ug. Shs 31,824,000 per yea-r if we assume that they worked only
six days a week.
Furthermore, 200 litres of fuel were spent per day at the water harvesting unit
hence an additional expense of Ug, Shs 4,224,000 per month. Unlike on the fish-
landing sites where the water -hyacinth was blown in and out by the wind
depending on its direction, at the dam the weed stayed there until it was
removed mechanically. If we just assume only four months of mechanical
harvesting a year, the total fuel cost used by the harvesting unit alone is
estimated at about Ug. Shs 16,896,000 million.
4.3.3 Effect of the Weed on Water Transport
The major effect on the water transport includes blocking the exit and entrance
of the boat operators as reported by the fishermen. Increase in their landing time
and increasing their operational costs for the small boat operators. However, in
Port Bell ship docking bay it was reported that when the ships were entering the
dock in the presence of the weed they took more time as they pushed against
the weed.
In 1996, Nkuba reported that Uganda railways co-operation had her services at a
port bell shifted temporarily because the pier had been damaged as a result of
ships exerting stronger force on the resisting weed during docking. It was
reported that it could be delayed up to 2 hours before docking in. In addition it
was reported to be choking the engine fillers of the ship thus increasing the
frequency of their clearing and replacement. As the ships entered the dock, they
pushed the weed against the bridge (link span) and at times caused it to break.
It was however not possible to obtain the detailed costs involved .
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4.3.4 Summary of Costs Incurred by the Economy due to the Water
hyacinth.
•
Cost imposed on the fisheries sub-sector
(1) Loss of income due to failure to go fishing
(a) Fishermen in open bays
(b) Fishermen operating in closed bays
(2) Loss of fishing nets
(3) Loss due to reduction in fish catches
(4) Cost of extra fuel used
(5) Cost incurred on purchase of ice
(6) Cost incurred due to engine repair
(7)Cost incurred due to replacement of motor boat engines
Sub-total:
Cost incurred by the economy due to sickness
Cost incurred due to irregularities in water supply
a) Income lost by NWSC
b) Expenses incurred on labour by NWSC
c) Water treatment
d) Servicing meters
e) Cost incurred by domestic consumers to improvise
Sub-total
1,440,576,000
70,731,072,000
23,100,000,000
10,012,464,000
4,425,120,000
5,457,375,00
181,912,500
952,875,000
116,310,390,000
6,855,960,000
32,951,920
14,400,000
255,780
2,000,000
18,503,100
68,110,800
," ':
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Cost incurred due to the weed interfering with power generation
a) Loss.of income by UEB because of not generating
b) Repairs of screens
c) Domestic consumer expenditure on use of paraffin for lighting
d) Domestic consumer expenditure on charcoal for cooking
e) Provision of 200 Its/day for mechanical removal
Sub-total
Transport cost incurred by the railways (not established)
529,615,400
12,500,000
209,661,960
31,824,000
16,896,000
1,378,003,420
Total 124,612.464,220
The water hyacinth therefore imposed a cost of one hundred and twenty four
point six one two billion shillings on Ugandan economy at minimum estimates
every year.
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4.4 Losses/Gains attributed to Resurgences, Perceptions and
Preparedness of the Lakeside Communities and Institutions towards
Sustainable Control of the Weed.
' ..
4.4.1 Perceptions towards Infestation and Resurgence
In the 1990s, the local communities and institutions fully appreciated the
magnitude of the massive weed that covered much of the shoreline and bays as
well as the floating mats in the open waters. Not only were the local sources of
the weed known but seasonal variations were also recognised. The months of
May to August were considered as the period of most severe attacks at Gaba
Fish Landing, as this was the period of strong winds blowing from the South
East, bringing the weed from the islands. The communities and institutions
regarded the weed as a major threat to their activities, environment and health of
their members. This sense of alert was maintained until the collapse of the weed
in 1998/99.
In the study, 89% had noticed resurgence after the weed had sunk in 1998/9.
For those who said they had noticed resurgence, 40% mentioned 2001 as the
year when it occurred. Others mentioned 2000 (25%), 2002 (15%) and 1999
(6%). The respondents at the fish landings of Bulingo in Bunjako bay on Lake
Victoria, Kibuko and Kalama on rivers Kagera and Nile respectively said the
weed has always been there. Management of the commercial establishments
visited (Entebbe Water Works, Lido Beach, Uganda Railways Corporation ferry
terminal at Port Bell and Nalubaale/Kiira Dam in Jinja) reported that they were
aware of the resurgence. At Lido beach, there had been occasional weed
invasions since the year 2000 and the manager attributed the resurgence to
windy conditions experienced in this location of the lake. Respondents at the
beaches mentioned winds (63%), rains (27%) and flow of the river (6%) as the
main causes. Most respondents (83%) said that much of the resurgent weed was
mainly seen at the shoreline.
Most of those who had noticed resurgence (56%) said that the weed did not
proliferate and there was no significant change in its coverage. Some
respondents said the resurgent weed was blown away by winds (45%), while
others said it was manually removed (12%). The respondents who said the weed
had proliferated (44%), attributed it to the laxity of the communities (39%),
absence of weevils to feed on it (36%) and the fast multiplication of the weed
(19%). Some of the respondents (46%) described the current plants as short
and unhealthy while 42% described them as healthy and big.
Most of those who had noticed resurgence (55%) had encountered invasions,
which mostly occurred at their beaches (87%), other beaches (10%) and fishing
grounds (3%)
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•Table 4.8: Places Where Respondents had Encountered Weed Invasions
Source: March 2002 Survey data
4.4.2 Socio-economic Impacts of the Weed
Most respondents (63%) associated the current weed with impacts on fish
production, water transport, beach environment, water quality and health of
fishing communities. However, fewer respondents (37%) said that the current
weed did not have any impacts and attributed this to the small sized and
unhealthy plants, which have not formed mobile mats responsible for inflicting
the most negative socio-economic impacts
Figure 4.1: Whether the Resurgent Weed had any Impacts
Whether or not the resurgent weed had any
im pacts
No
37%
Source: March 2002 Survey data
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Most of those who said the current weed had impacts on fish production, 48%
said the weed drifts/entangles fishing gears, covers fishing (20%) and breeding
(8%) groun~s.
Table 4.9: Impacts on Fish Production.
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Cover breeding grounds 9 8
Cover fishing grounds 20 20
Drifts/entangles fishing gears 49 48
Other 5 5
No impact 19 18
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Source: Survey data, 2002
Respondents said the weed affected water transport most by blocking transport
routes (58%) wherever there was an invasion, affected beach
environmenUsurrounding most by making the beach muddy (57%), and affected
water quality most by making it muddy (45%). However, most respondents
(54%) said that the current weed did not have any impacts on health of fishing
communities. Only a few respondents said the weed affected the health of
fishing communities when it harboured snakes (18%), snails (13%) and
mosquitoes (6%) suggesting that the health problems attributed to the weed had
been reduced.
At Entebbe Water Works, management reported that they had not faced any
impacts from the current weed on their water purifying processes since they had
maintained infrastructure that prevents any blockage of the pumps and choking
of the filters. At Nalubaale and Kiira power dams, management reported that
they had not faced any impacts on their power generation activities because the
weed has not been given the opportunity to form mats because it is effectively
removed. At Uganda Railways Corporation ferry terminal at Port Bell,
management also reported that they had not faced any impact on their docking
activities. At Lido beach, however, the occasional weed invasions made the
beach untidy and dirty for any swimming and other beach games.
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•4.4.3 Local Community Preparedness
Most respondents (76%) said they still had beach committees/authorities that,
were charged with the duty of spearheading control of the current weed. The
most commonly mentioned committees/authorities were LMCs (52%), Gabunga
(26%), DFR staff (17%) and Water Hyacinth Management Committee (2%).
Respondents were asked whether the above beach authorities/committees were
still playing an active role in controlling the current weed and most of them (72%)
agreed and mentioned mobilisation of the community for manual removal (82%),
soliciting for funds to pay hired labourers (14%) and maintaining weevil nurseries
(4%). The few respondents (28%) who said the above committees were not
active mostly attributed it to the absence of serious weed threat at their beaches
(80%), lack of community support (12%) and equipment (4%).
Most respondents (58%) said that there were special measures instituted at their
beaches to manually control the weed and these included, bye-laws formulated
to oblige every community member to participate in or contribute funds/fish for .
the manual removal of the weed (83%) and declared a special day in a week or
when the weed invades the beach for manual removal (8%). At some beaches,
fishers were asked to carry along with them some plants whenever they returned
from fishing (5%).
Twelve out of the fourteen beaches visited had ever received equipment for
control of the weed. Kalama fish landing near Namasagali on Victoria Nile and
Namoni on Lake Victoria had never received any equipment. Wanseko and
Mubogo received their equipment from the District authorities through the DFO
while Bukungu and Kansiira received equipment from UFFCA. None of the
beaches had ever procured their own equipment indicating high dependency on
Government. This may not be sustainable. An inventory of the equipment was
taken (Table 9.1) and as noted most of the equipment was either worn out or
lost.
Three of the surveyed beaches had weevil nurseries. At Majanji, Wakawaka and
Kibuko/Kagera, the nurseries had been relatively well maintained as reported by
most respondents (55%). At Bukungu fish landing, all respondents said the
nursery was no longer in existence because the facilities had been washed away
by EI nino. However, most respondents (83%) said that there was need to
establish weevil nurseries at their beaches, because they feared weed invasions
(42%), the fact that the weed is there to stay (33%) and weed proliferation (18%).
Respondents were asked to mention their most preferred method that would be
effective for the control of the current weed and most of them (62%) mentioned
biological control, followed by those who mentioned physical removal (28%) and
chemical spray (6%). Respondents at Kibuuko fish landing on River Kagera
suggested a re-establishment of the boom as the most effective control of the
weed in that riverine environment.
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Figure 4.2: Recommended Method for Effective Weed Control
Recommended methods for effective weed
control
Manual
removal
21%
Mechanical
removal
7%
Chemical
Other spray
4% 6%
Biological
control
62%
• Source: March 2002 Survey data
All committee members/authorities charged with the duty of spearheading control
of the weed complained of a number of problems faced in discharging their
duties. These included lack of equipment, lack of willingness on the part of
community members to manually remove the weed and lack of facilitation for
them as beach authorities.
As other efforts that should be put in place to help in the control of the weed at
community level, respondents suggested assistance from Government such as
replacement of worn out equipment (67%), re/establishment of weevil nurseries
(26%) and payment of allowances to authorities/committee members that are
charged with duty of spearheading control activities (5%).
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Table 4.10: An Inventory of Equipment Supplied to Fish _landings for Water
hyacinth Control
Fish landing Equipment No. No. No. No.
Received Workin Unusable Lost
g
Bukungu Wheel burrows 5 5
Rakes 10 10
Hip boots/waders 5 5
Gloves 5 pairs 5 pairs
Forks 10 10
Kansiira Wheel burrows 1 1
Rakes 2
Pangas 2 1 1
Forks 2 2
Kagwara Wheel burrows 2 2
Rakes 4 4
Hip boots/waders 1 pair 1
Gloves 2 pairs 2
Pangas 2 2
Forks 2 2
Wanseko Wheel burrows 4 2 2
Gum boots 2 2
Rakes 2 2
Pangas 1 1
Spades 2 2
Forks 2 2
Mubogo Wheel burrows 1 1
Gum boots 1 1
Ggaba Wheel burrows 5 3 2
Rakes 15 10 5
Gum boots 3 pairs 3 pairs
Hip boots 2 pairs 2 pairs
Gloves 10 pairs 10 pairs
Pangas 15 15
Overalls 2 2
Forks 10 5 5
Wakawaka Wheel burrows 2 2
Rakes 25 4 21
Gum boots 7 pairs 7 pairs
Hip boots 2 pairs 2 pairs
Gloves 25 pairs 25 pairs
Pangas 25 25
Majanji Wheel burrows 2 2
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•Fish landing Equipment No. No. No. No.
Received Workin Unusable Lost
g
RaKes 2 2 .-
Forks 1 1
Bulingo Wheel burrows 1 1
Rakes 2 2
Hip boots 2 pairs 2 pairs
Gloves 2 pairs 1 pair 1 pair
Pang as 4 4
Forks 2 2
Kibuko/Kagera Wheel burrows 25 3 22
Rakes 25 25
Gum boots 25 pairs 1 pair 24
pairs
Hip boots 25 pairs 1 pair 24
pairs
Gloves 25 pairs 1 pair 24
pairs
Pangas 25 25
Overalls 25 25
Kitubulu Wheel burrows 1 1
Rakes 1 1 5
Source: March 2002 Survey data
4.4.4 Institutional Preparedness
Management of the four establishments reported that they had continued to
maintain personnel, equipment or structures to control the weed. At Entebbe
Water Works, it was reported that they had maintained a steel cage around the
intake point, which prevents the weed from blocking the pumps and choking the
filters. In addition, when the weed invades the intake point, the service men
remove the weed and throw it away.
However, they regularly incur maintenance costs to ensure that the structure is
effective in controlling the weed debris. The management also reported that they
would be willing to contribute towards national control efforts through provision of
knowledge/advice. Since they are well equipped with qualified personnel and
good facilities like laboratories, they would play an active role in the control of
water hyacinth.
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•At Lido beach, a team of casual labourers was in place to manually remove the
weed whenever it invaded.
At Nalubaale and Kiira power dams, management reported that they contribu-ted
Ug. Shs. 300,000 per month for the fuelling of the machinery of the onshore
stationary system at the dams and also promised to continue with the facilitation.
They have also put in place and maintained four sets of booms to trap the free-
floating weeds at the source of River Nile, nose of the new canal, Nalubaale and
Kiira dam which are later removed. They also clean the water screens as part of
their routine activities.
At Uganda Railways Corporation ferry terminal at Port Bell, management
reported that they contributed to the facilitation of the mobile harvester system
and also pledged to continue with this support. They also monitor weed attack in
the bay and keep the supervisor of the mobile system informed .
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•5.0 Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Conclusions
' ..
The economic losses associated with water hyacinth infestation at local and
national level were high as compared to gains from the weed. A lot of money
was lost due to water hyacinth impacts during the peak attack in the 1990s.
There are no significant losses attributed to the current resurgence. However,
fishermen operating in the water hyacinth storage bays like Murchison, Thruston,
Hannington and Waiya bay are affected by the weed infestation. In comparison,
the losses were greater during the last peak attack in the 1990s.
Generally the gains from most uses of the weed were minimal and in most cases
few enterprises utilised the weed at a large scale. Many of these collapsed after
the weed biomass reduced in the 1990s.
The communities and institutions in the areas affected by water hyacinth are still
aware of the problem. They are also aware of the periodic resurgence of the
weed, which, when it occurs, impacts socio-economic activities. Debris from
dead water hyacinth" is affecting fishery activities, water transport, beach
environment, water quality, and health of communities.
Beach authorities/committees and lakeside institutions have maintained some
level of preparedness. However, there are some cases of laxity and lack of
community support towards manual control and inadequate control over
equipment supplied. The weevil nurseries are reported to be inadequate in
number and some are not well maintained.
5.2 Recommendations
There is need to strengthen knowledge of the water hyacinth problem at
community and institutional levels through seminars and meetings, especially
among those communities living in areas known to be 'hot spots' to awaken
communities and institutions that had relaxed in their control activities.
There is need to create more awareness of the socio-economic impacts of the
weed among communities and institutions. Institutions responsible for control as
well as for alleviating impacts should also be made aware of the impacts of the
resurgent and proliferating weed.
Equipment for manual control should be supplied to communities especially
those located along the river and in bays that are known to be water hyacinth hot
spots. These should be assigned to a specific beach authority such as the
Landing Management Committees (LMC) who will be accountable for them.
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Weevil nurseries should also be re-established, and concerned __authorities
should provide training and regular supervision.
Socio-economic --monitoring of-community- and institutional knowledge,. weed
impacts, level of preparedness and control impacts should be carried out on a
regular basis .
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Appendices
Appendix.1
Fisheries Resources Research Institute: Socio-economics component
Unit questionnaire
Background information
1) Name of enumerator
2) Date
3) Landing
4) District
B. Personal data
5) Name of respondent
6) Age years
7) Sex:
[1] Male [2] Female
8) What is your level of education? (tick one)
[1] No schooling. [2] Primary [3] Secondary
[6] Other (specify) _
[4] Tertiary [5] University
I
9) What activity are you engaged in?
[1] Fishery activity [2] Transport [3] Hotel business [4] Fetching water
[5] Other (specify) _
10) If fishery, what is the main fish species that you target?
[1] Nile perch [2] Tilapia [3] Mukene [4] Other (Specify) _
11) For how long have you been involved in this fishery activity? _
years
12) How long have you been at this landing? years
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fC. Knowledge of Changes in Water hyacinth Proliferation
13) Since the massive water hyacinth disappeared,. have you noticed any
resurgence?
[1] Yes [2] No
14) If yes, when did this occur? (Month/year) _
15) What do you think are the causes of resurgence?
[1] Rains [2] Winds [3] Other (specify) _
16) Where was the resurgence?
[1] Inshore [2] Offshore [3] Shore line[4] Others (specify) _
17) Since the resurgence, has the weed proliferated?
[1] Yes [2] No (Go to 22) [3] Don't know
18) If yes, why did it proliferate?
[1] Weevils are not enough to feed on it
[2] Local community control activities are relaxed
[3] Other (specify) _
19) If it proliferated, does it cover large areas?
[1] Yes [2] No (Go to) [3] Don't know
20) Describe changes in the morphology of the weed since resurgent
21) If no, what has happened to the resurgent weed?
[1] Disappeared (Go to)
[2] No significant change
[3]Manually removed
[4] Weevils killed it
[5] Winds blew it away
[6] Other (specify) _
22) Since resurgence, have you encountered any weed invasions?
[1] Yes [2] No (Go to) [3] Don't know
23) If yes, where was this?
[1] At this beach [2] Fishing grounds [3] Breeding grounds
[4] Other beaches (specify) _
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ID. Impacts associated with the Current Weed
24) Are there any impacts associated with the current weed?
[1] Yes [2] No (Go to 31) ..
25) If yes, how is fish production most affected currently?
[1] Covers breeding grounds [2] Covers fishing grounds
[3] Drifts/entangles fishing gears
[4] Other (Specify) _
[5] No impact
26) If yes, how is water transport most affected?
[1] Blocks transport routes [2] Clogs engines
[3] Makes beach muddy for passengers to alight
[4] Other (Specify) _
[5] No impact
27) If yes, how is beach environment/surrounding most affected?
[1] Makes beach muddy [2] Blocks the beach
[3] Other (Specify) _
[4] No impact
28) If yes, how is water quality most affected?
[1] Makes water muddy [2] Water with debris
[3] Unpleasant odour [4] Other (Specify) _
[5] No impact
If yes, how is health of the communities most affected?
[1] Harbours mosquitoes [2] Harbours Snakes [3] Harbo~rs snails
[4] Other (Specify) _
[5] No impact
29) If there are no impacts associated with the weed, explain why
E. Preparedness and Suggested efforts towards Sustainable Control at
the Community level
30) Is there a beach authority charged with spearheading control of the current
weed?
[1] Yes [2] No (Go to) [3] Don't know
,
-'-",.
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31) If yes, which one is this?
[1] Water Hyacinth Management Committee [2] LMC
[4] DFR staff [5] Other (Specify) _
40
[3] Gabunga
fI
32) If yes, is the authority/committee playing an active rolejn controlling the
current weed?
[1] Yes [2] No (Go to: 36)
33) If yes, what roles does the authority/committee play following resurgence?
(tick all that apply)
[1] Mobilisation of the community for manual removal
[2] Soliciting for funds to pay hired labourer
[3] Keeping/maintaining the equipment
[4] Maintaining weevil nursery
[5] Other (Specify) _
34) If no, why is the committee not active? (tick all that apply)
[1] Lack of facilitation [2] Lack of equipment
[3] Lack of community support [4] Lack of willingness
[5] No weed threat [6] Other (Specify) _
35) Are you aware of any special measures instituted at this beach to manually
control the weed?
[1] Yes [2] No [3] Don't know
36) If yes, which ones are these? (tick all that apply)
[1] Declared a special day for removing the weed
[2] Every fisher is obliged to come back with weeds in the boat
[3] Whole community is obliged to participate in removal
[4] Whole community is obliged to contribute funds
[5] Other (specify) _
37) Are you aware of the presence of weevil nurseries at this beach?
[1] Yes [2] No [3] Don't know
38) If yes, is the nursery well maintained?
[1] Yes [2] No [3] Don't know
39) If not, what is lacking? (tick all that apply)
[1] Nursery not cleaned [2] Weevils not fed [3] Weevils not watered
[4] Weevils not harvested
[5] Other (Specify) _
40) If nursery is not well maintained, why not? (tick all that apply)
[1] Lack of training
[2] Lack of interest
[3] No weed threat
[4] Other (Specify) _
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41) If there is no nursery, is there a need to establish one?
[1] Yes [2] No [3] Don't know
42) If yes, why do you think so?
[1] Weed proliferation [2] Weed invasion [3] Weed is there to stay
[4] Other (Specify) _
43) What methods do you recommend to effectively control the current weed?
[1] Chemical spray [2] Biological [3] Mechanical control
[4] Manual removal [5] Other (specify) _
44) What other efforts should be put in place to help communities control the
current weed?
[1] Assistance with equipment
[2] Payment of allowances to the responsible authority/committees
[3] Re/establishment of weevil nurseries
[4] Other (specify) _
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Appendix 2
Key Informant Questionnaire with Beach authorities and Managers of Key
establishments. ....
1.Do you think that the weed ever disappeared on the lake?
If yes when did it disappear ? : .
2. How did it disappear? (Measures) .
3. Has there been a resurgence of the weed in this area?
If yes when did you first see the resurgent weed?
4.Where is it coming from? .
5. What is your general opinion about the resurgent weed?
Section B :
Impacts of the Weed:
6. Has it formed mats on the shore/at this installation or is it freely floating out at
the Lake? .
7. How has the weed affected the activities of the key installation?
................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................
Section C :
Preparedness:
8. What measures has your installation taken to address this issue?
9. What role could your institution play in national efforts to control this weed?
(e.g. manpower, technologies, equipment and funding)
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10 .What are your opinions of the following control measures
a) Manual control
b) Biological control
c) Chemical control
11. What other ideas would your institution like to put for control of this weed?
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Appendix 3
-Foc~s Group Discussion Guidelines
Section A:
Knowledge and Perception of Fishing Communities about the Resurgence
of the Weed
1. Do you think that the weed ever disappeared on the lake?
If yes when did it disappear? '
2. How did it disappear? (measures)
3. Has there been a resurgence of the weed in this area?
If yes when did you first see the resurgent weed?
4. Where is it coming from?
5. What is your opinion about the resurgent weed?
6. Has it formed mats at the shore/installation? or is it still floating on the lake?
Section B:
Impacts of the Resurgent weed
How has it affected the following?
7. Water transport:-
--
a) Manually propelled boats
b) Motorised boats
8. Fishing activities:-
i) Fishing grounds
ii) Breeding grounds
iii) Fish catches (production)
iv) Fishing gears
v) Fishing transport
iv) Marketing/quality
45
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•9. Water supply and quality:-
(Alternative sources of water)
10. Environment and health of the fishing communities/people living around the
infested area;
Section. C:
How prepared are the communities:
11.What measures has the communities put in place to control the resurgence of
water hyacinth in this area?
12. What are your opinions on the following control measures?
a) Manual control
b) Biological control (will they help in breeding the weevils?)
c) Chemical control
12. Do you still have facilities to control the weed?
If yes what facilities do you have?
13. What is the role of the local leaders in the control of this resurgent weed?
14. What are your expectations from government?
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